In General: Licenses, Regulatiion and Employment of Brokers by Peck, R.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 41 Issue 1 Article 4 
April 1964 
In General: Licenses, Regulatiion and Employment of Brokers 
R. Peck 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R. Peck, In General: Licenses, Regulatiion and Employment of Brokers, 41 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 41 (1964). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol41/iss1/4 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
IN GENERAL: LICENSES, REGULATION AND
EMPLOYMENT OF BROKERS
THE REQUIREMENT OF A LICENSE
CHAPTER 1 14/2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, the act regulating
real estate brokers and salesmen, requires that anyone acting as
a real estate broker must register with the Illinois Department of
Registration and Education and obtain a certificate of registration
therefrom.' Moreover, in some areas, the broker incurs the addi-
tional responsibility of procuring a license from the municipality
in which he carries on his brokerage activities.2
The statute defines a real estate broker as:
... any person, association, co-partnership or corporation, who for
a... valuable consideration sells or offers to sell, buys or offers to
buy, or negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of real estate,
or who leases or offers to lease, rents or offers to rent, any real
estate or negotiates leases thereof, or of the improvements thereon
for another or others.8
Exempted from the act are those who perform the above men-
tioned services with regard to their own property, or who act as
attorneys-in-fact under power of attorney from an owner authoriz-
ing final consummation by the performance of any contract of sale,
lease or exchange of real estate. Also excepted are those acting as at-
torneys-at-law, receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, administrators or
executors, those selling real estate under order of court, trustees
under trust agreements or deeds in trust, or regularly salaried em-
ployees thereof.
4
By virtue of the act, the real estate broker is precluded from
bringing any action for the purpose of recovering compensation
for his services, unless, prior to the time he offered to perform such
services or procured a promise for compensation, he was duly
registered under the act.'
1 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 1141, § 1 (1963), states: "It is unlawful for any person to act as
a real estate broker or real estate salesman, or to advertise or to assume to act as such
real estate broker or real estate salesman, without a certificate of registration issued by
the Department of Registration and Education .
2 For a discussion of the relationship between the Illinois statute governing real
estate brokers and municipal ordinances in the same area, see Kneier, Licensing By Local
Government, 1957 U. Ill. L.F. 8.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1141, § 2 (1963).
4 Ibid.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 114V, § 2(b) (1963).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Although there seems to be no set rule for determining
exactly how many transactions a person must conduct in order to
be classified as a real estate broker, it appears well settled that a
single isolated sale is not sufficient." In O'Neill v. Sinclair,7 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a single sale did not make a hard-
ware dealer a real estate broker within the meaning of a municipal
ordinance which defined a real estate broker as one ". . . engaged
in selling or negotiating sales of real estate belonging to others."
One who intends to pursue the occupation of a real estate
broker should be extremely careful that he performs no acts as a
real estate broker until he has in his possession a certificate of
registration from the State of Illinois. In Cooper v. Schoeberlein,8
a real estate broker, before rendering any services as such, applied
for a certificate of registration; however, his application was not
approved until after the entire transaction for which he claimed
compensation had been concluded. In holding that the mere ap
plication for a certificate is not tantamount to registration, the
court said:
In order for a real estate broker to recover commissions, he must
have a formal certificate required by the state, at the time he per-
forms the services for which he seeks compensation, unless for
some cause connected with the administration of said Department
of Registration and Education .... 9
Of course, as the court indicated, if, through the fault of the State,
the broker fails to receive his certificate at such time as he is
required to be registered, he may still enforce his contract for a
commission so long as his application has been approved by that
time.1
60 O'Neill v. Sinclair, 153 Ill. 525, 39 N.E. 124 (1894); First Nat'l Bank of Millstadt
v. Freant, 7 Ill. App. 2d 204, 129 N.E.2d 276 (4th Dist. 1955); Packer v. Sheppard, 127 111.
App. 598 (1st Dist. 1906).
7 153 Ill. 525, 39 N.E. 124 (1894).
8 247 111. App. 147 (2d Dist. 1928).
9 Id. at 155.
10 Lucas v. Adomatis, 236 Ill. App. 254 (lst Dist. 1925), presents a case in which the
broker's application for registration had been approved prior to the time he rendered any
services, but, because of a lack of forms in the Department of Registration and Education,
his certificate of registration was not received until after he had performed his services.
The court held that the broker was entitled to his compensation, since all of his services
had been performed after his registration had been approved, and, therefore, the broker
had substantially complied with the law. (At the time of this decision and the decision in
Cooper v. Schoeberlein, supra note 8, 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 1141/2, § 2(b) [see note 15] had not
yet become law, so it was necessary only that the broker be licensed during the time he
rendered services.)
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Although the statute" clearly requires that the broker be
registered at the time he offers to perform his services or obtains
the promise of compensation for such services, it gives no indica-
tion as to his rights in the event that his registration expires12 subse-
quent to that time, but prior to the time he is to be paid. Reed v.
Young" and Voellinger v. Kohl, 14 while decided before the act
under consideration became law,15 indicate the probable outcome
of such a situation under the present statute. In both cases, the
broker was duly licensed at the inception of his contract of employ-
ment and throughout the period during which he rendered his
services. In each case, the broker's license terminated before the
sale, which his services had brought about, was consummated. In
neither case did the broker engage in any activity pertinent to the
sale after his license had expired. The courts held that it was suffi-
cient that brokers were licensed during the time when they
rendered their services; the fact that their registrations had expired
prior to the actual closings, in which the brokers took no part, in
no way affected their rights to compensation. Thus, it may be
reasoned that today a broker must be registered both at the time
set forth in the statute and throughout the time he is rendering his
services.
Another situation not covered by the statute arises where a
broker, duly registered by the State of Illinois, carries out a con-
tract of employment made in a city or state in which he is not
licensed, or transacts the sale of land situated in such a city or state.
In Frankel v. Allied Mills," a broker, registered in Illinois, entered
into a contract in New York to sell land in Illinois. At the time of
the contract, New York had a statute which specifically prohibited
anyone from operating as a real estate broker in that state, without
first obtaining a license from one of its agencies. Moreover, the
New York law denied the right to bring an action for compensation
to anyone acting in violation of that statute. The Illinois Supreme
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 114V, § 2(b) (1963).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 114V2, § 6.01 (1963), requires that a real estate broker's registration
must be renewed annually.
13 146 Ill. App. 210 (1st Dist. 1909).
14 261 Ill. App. 271 (4th Dist. 1931).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 114V, § 2(b) (1963), which requires that a real estate broker be
registered prior to the time he offers to perform his services or procures a promise for
compensation, was added in 1947.
16 369 Il. 578, 17 N.E.2d 570 (1938).
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Court, in refusing to allow the broker to recover on his contract,
stated that when a statute declares an act to be unlawful, and im-
poses a penalty for its violation, a contract for the performance of
that act is void. The court, relying upon conflict of laws principles,
held that, since the contract was invalid where entered into, it
could not be enforced in Illinois.
A situation slightly different from that in Frankel arose in
First Nat'l Bank of Millstadt v. Freant,17 and resulted in a recovery
for the broker. There, a broker, licensed under the statutes of Illi-
nois and the Municipal Code of East St. Louis, brought about the
sale of land situated in Bellville. The city of Bellville had an ordi-
nance which required that a license fee be paid by any person
carrying on business as a real estate broker in that city, and impos-
ing a fine for its violation. It was the defendant's contention that
the broker, having failed to pay the required fee, was not entitled
to receive compensation for selling land within the city. The court,
however, pointed out that such ordinances are aimed at licensing
the broker's occupation, but that the location' of the land sold by the
broker is of no significance. The broker's single sale was insufficient
to classify him as one doing business as a broker in Bellville, and
the fact that the land was situated there had no effect upon his
right to compensation. The court went on to say that, because there
was nothing in the ordinance making it unlawful to operate as a
real estate broker without a license from the city, a contract made
in violation thereof would, nevertheless, be valid. Laws such as the
one under consideration, which require no more than that a fee
be paid, and imposing only a fine for their violation, are aimed at
obtaining revenue rather than regulating an occupation. And the
trend, said the court, is to limit the penalties for their violation to
those provided by the laws themselves.
Together, Frankel and Millstadt seem to stand for the proposi-
tions that the Illinois courts will not enforce a real estate broker's
contract of employment if it is invalid at the place where entered
into; however, the courts of Illinois will enforce a real estate
broker's employment contract, although the fulfillment of that
contract may subject the broker to a fine, so long as there are no
17 7 Ill. App. 2d 204, 129 N.E.2d 276 (4th Dist. 1955).
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laws specifically invalidating the contract, as in Frankel, or so long
as the law violated is not aimed directly at regulating the activities
of real estate brokers. In no case will the location of the land to be
dealt with by the broker be the determining factor in deciding
whether or not he is conducting his brokerage business in a partic-
ular area.18
Although a broker is duly licensed under the statutes which
govern his occupation, it sometimes happens that, while conduct-
ing his brokerage business, he violates other statutes. Such a situa-
tion arose in Mickelson v. Kolb.1 9 There, a broker, licensed under
state and municipal statutes, carried on business in violation of an
act making it unlawful to do business under an assumed name
without first registering with the county clerk. The court held that
the broker's contract for a commission in return for services
rendered while violating the act was unenforceable, because a con-
tract to do an illegal act is void. However, in a later case, Grody v.
Scalone,2 ° the Illinois Supreme Court held that the law requiring
registry of fictitious names did not render invalid a contract to
install a heating unit, although the law had not been complied
with. The court, using the reasoning relied upon in the Millstadt2'
case, pointed out that since the legislature provided within the act
a penalty for its violation, the law makers intended such a penalty
to be exclusive. The court went on to criticize the decision in
Mickelson and held that while the violators of such statutes may be
subjected to the penalties provided therein, contracts for acts
which violate the statutes will not be affected.
It should be noted that in both Grody and Millstadt the courts
looked upon the laws in question as revenue measures rather than
attempts to regulate. Thus, violations of such acts had no relation
18 In First Nat'l Bank of Millstadt v. Freant, id. at 208, 129 N.E.2d at 278, the court
pointed out that, while a single isolated sale of land in Bellville did not constitute doing
business as a real estate broker there, a series of such transactions might well have
brought the person conducting such transactions within the city's ordinance which
licensed real estate brokers. For other cases similar to Millstadt on this point, see O'Dea
v. Throm, 250 II. App. 577, 163 N.E. 390 (3d Dist. 1928), where a single act was held not
to bring an Illinois broker within a foreign statute; Egeland v. Scheffler, 189 I11. App.
426 (1st Dist. 1914), and Cervenka v. Hunter, 185 Ill. App. 547 (1st Dist. 1914), where the
single acts of out of state brokers were held not to bring them within a Chicago ordinance.
19 337 Ill. App. 493, 86 N.E.2d 152 (1st Dist. 1949).
20 408 Ill. 61, 96 N.E.2d 97 (1951).
21 First Nat'l Bank of Millstadt v. Freant, 7 111. App. 2d 204, 129 N.E.2d 276 (4th
Dist. 1955).
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to the contracts which were made. The same was true in the
Mickelson case, since the rights and liabilities under the contract
of employment of a real estate broker were wholly unrelated to the
broker's registration under an assumed name statute.
It is interesting to note that while the statute denies the right
to enforce contracts for compensation to brokers who are not duly
registered,22 there seem to be no cases deciding what remedy, if any,
is available to one who has paid compensation to such a broker.
In Anderson v. Elliott,23 part of the relief sought was the
return of a commission paid to an unlicensed real estate broker.
The court, while agreeing with the plaintiff that an unlicensed
agent has no right to recover compensation for procuring a pur-
chaser for real estate, refused the plaintiff's request because he had
failed to discuss the question as to whether or not such compensa-
tion, once paid, can be recovered. The court dismissed the com-
plaint without pursuing the issue further.
CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT
Although the statute of frauds in Illinois requires that any
contract for the sale of land must be in writing,24 it makes no such
requirement with regard to real estate brokers' contracts of em-
ployment. However, any claim of compensation by a real estate
broker must be based upon a contract, express or implied, with the
person from whom the compensation is sought, or on ratification of
the broker's acts by such person. 5
Even if the services rendered by a broker are beneficial to the
property owner, unless the broker has a contract of employment
with the owner, he is not entitled to any compensation. Thus, in
Forney v. LaSusa,26 a broker called upon a property owner, intro-
duced himself as a broker and asked if the owner would be willing
to sell. The owner replied that he would, if a certain price could
be netted. The owner then supplied the broker with information
about the property and allowed the broker to show it to prospec-
22 Ii. Rev. Stat. ch. 114V2, § 2(b) (1963).
23 1 Ii1. App. 2d 448, 117 N.E2d 876 (1st Dist. 1954).
24 Ii1. Rev. Stat. ch. 50, § 2 (1963).
25 5 I.L.P., Brokers § 72 (1953).
26 8 Ill. App. 2d 555, 132 N.E.2d 55 (1st Dist. 1956).
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tive buyers. The court held that, although the broker had procured
a purchaser, he was not entitled to any commission from the owner.
The court pointed out that at no time did the owner express a
willingness to pay the broker a commission, nor did the broker
ever lead the owner to believe that he expected to be paid by him.27
In Churchill v. Richards,2" the defendant wrote to the plaintiff, a
real estate broker, and asked if he knew of anyone who would be
willing to trade land for a stock of merchandise. The broker
replied that he did, and introduced the defendant to a third party.
The defendant and the third party failed to consummate a sale;
however, the third party, also a real estate broker, found a buyer
for the defendant's goods. The plaintiff then sued, claiming that
he was entitled to a commission from the defendant. The court
held that a broker seeking a commission must show that he was
employed by the person from whom the commission is sought. But
in this case, the defendant's letter to the plaintiff was merely an
inquiry as to whether the plaintiff represented someone who might
be interested in a trade with the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff had
no contract with the defendant to procure a trade for the defend-
ant's goods. In Turek v. Opava,29 the plaintiff, a broker employed
by a third party who was in the market for real estate, approached
the defendant and began negotiating on behalf of his employer for
the defendant's land. Subsequently, a sale was consummated be-
tween the third party and the defendant, and the plaintiff brought
an action against the defendant for a commission. The court, in
holding for the defendant, stated that where one acting for another
desiring to purchase land approaches the owner and negotiates for
a purchase, no contract will be implied on the part of the owner
to pay the broker for his services. The broker must have been em-
ployed by the one from whom the compensation is sought.
8 0
Ordinarily, the broker's contract of employment arises out of
express words. However, no particular words or form are necessary
in order to create a contract of employment between a broker and
his principal, so long as the broker acts with the consent of his
27 Bunn v. Smith, 190 I11. App. 530 (3d Dist. 1914), held to the same effect on an
almost identical set of facts.
28 163 I11. App. 500 (3d Dist. 1911).
29 192 Ill. App. 270 (1st Dist. 1915).
30 For a holding to the same effect, see Day v. Hale, 50 Ill. App. 115 (1st Dist. 1892).
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principal." Such consent was manifested through words in Kelley
v. Martin.82 There the principal hesitated to consummate the sale
because the broker demanded a commission of 5%, but later
told the broker to "go ahead," the court held that the principal
had assented to a contract of employment for a 5% commission.
In Greenwald v. Marcus,"3 the seller requested that the broker
find a buyer at a certain price. The court held that the
seller's request and the broker's acceptance had created a contract
of employment. And in Purgett v. Weinrank,4 the broker asked
the vendor, ". . . what will you take for your farm ... and let me
sell it for you?" The vendor answered that he would take $200 an
acre. Later the broker informed the vendor that he had placed an
advertisement for the sale of his farm in a local newspaper. The
vendor replied, "All right." It was held that the words of the ven-
dor were sufficient to show his consent to the broker's agency.
In some cases, acts accompanying a seller's words have been
instrumental in evidencing his consent to a broker's employment.
For example, in Korman v. Wanen Catalpa Apartments, Inc.,5 the
broker had a conversation with the defendant regarding the sale
of the latter's apartment building, and agreed to accept a flat com-
mission in the event that he should procure a buyer. Although
there seemed to be some conflict as to exactly what was said at that
time, there was substantial evidence that the defendant subse-
quently arranged with the janitor of the building so that the
broker could show it to prospective purchasers. Further evidence
showed that on two occasions the defendant set up meetings with
his lawyer and prospective purchasers sent by the broker. The
court, in granting a recovery to the broker, stated that no particular
words are required for a contract employing a real estate broker to
procure a purchaser for realty, and ordinarily all that is necessary
is that the broker act with the consent of the owner of the property.
In this case, the actions of the owner toward the broker and those
31 Korman v. Wanen Catalpa Apartments, Inc., 20 Ii. App. 2d 598, 156 N.E.2d 621
(Ist Dist. 1959); Read v. Tate, 20 I1. App. 2d 147, 155 N.E.2d 337 (3d Dist. 1959); Doss
v. Kirk, 8 Il. App. 2d 536, 132 N.E.2d 49 (4th Dist. 1956); Purgett v. Weinrank, 219 Il.
App. 28 (2d Dist. 1920).
32 169 Ill. App. 92 (4th Dist. 1912).
833 Ill. App. 2d 495, 123 N.E.2d 49 (1st Dist. 1954).
34 219 Ill. App. 28 (2d Dist. 1920).
85 20 Ill. App. 2d 598, 156 N.E.2d 621 (1st Dist. 1959).
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whom he procured as prospects was sufficient to show that the
broker acted with the consent of the owner. In Doss v. Kirk, 6 the
broker was showing property to the defendants when one of them
asked the broker whether he had anyone interested in their house.
The defendant told the broker that if he had anybody who would
give $16,000, to let them look at it. Subsequently, the broker
showed the defendant's house with the consent of the defendants.
When the house was finally sold at $12,500 to a buyer procured by
the broker, one of the defenses raised against the broker's claim for
a commission was that he had no contract of employment. The
court answered this contention by referring to the words of the
defendant and by pointing out that the broker was allowed to show
the house to prospective purchasers with the consent of the de-
fendants. The court felt that the words and actions of the defend-
ants left no doubt that they had placed their property for sale with
the broker.
8 7
Of course, the words and acts of the parties do not always
warrant a finding that a contract of employment has been created.
For example, in Whiston v. David Mayer Bldg. Corp.,38 a broker
was approached by a third party who desired to find property for
rent. The broker then called the defendant, who had such prop-
erty, and told him of the prospective lessee. The broker also stated
that he wished to represent the defendant in the transaction. The
defendant, while he did not expressly accept the broker's offer of
representation, did allow the broker to bring the prospect to his
office for exploratory negotiations. The parties failed to reach any
agreement at that meeting. The broker, however, continued to
pursue a deal between the parties, but the evidence indicated that
both parties ignored his efforts. There was evidence which specifi-
cally showed that the broker placed several calls to the defendant,
but that the defendant never returned his calls. When the parties
did ultimately consummate a lease, the broker sued the defendant
for a commission. The court held that the broker could not recover,
because he had failed to show that there was any contract of em-
ployment between the defendant and himself. While the broker
36 8 Ill. App. 2d 536, 132 N.E.2d 49 (4th Dist. 1956).
37 For similar cases, see: O'Dea v. Throm, 250 Ill. App. 577 (3d Dist. 1928); Knight
v. Knight, 142 Ii1. App. 62 (lst Dist. 1908).
88 337 Ill. App. 67, 84 N.E.2d 858 (lst Dist. 1949).
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had offered to represent the defendant, his offer was never ex-
pressly accepted. Although the defendant allowed the broker to
take part in one discussion regarding the lease, that was not evi-
dence that the defendant accepted the broker's offer. There was no
evidence that the broker represented the defendant in that dis-
cussion. Thus, not even an implied contract could be created from
the facts in this case.
In Lazerus v. McCann-Erickson, Inc.,89 the plaintiff, a broker,
was hired by a tenant of the defendant to find a sublessee. Another
of the defendant's lessees agreed to sub-lease the premises in ques-
tion on the condition that he could be assured that he would be
able to continue to rent the sub-leased premises until the expira-
tion of the lease under which he held other parts of the premises.
This condition was required because the lease of the sub-lessor was
due to terminate nineteen months before that which the prospec-
tive sub-lessee held on other parts of the premises. The broker got
the defendant landlord to grant the sub-lessee an option to rent
the sub-leased premises at the expiration of the sub-lessor's lease,
and the sub-lease was consummated. After collecting a commission
for finding a lessee for the sub-lessor, the broker brought an action
for compensation from the defendant landlord on the theory that
he had procured a tenant for the defendant who would rent the
sub-leased premises for nineteen months after the termination of
the sub-lease. The broker contended that, because he had done
work for the defendant on prior occasions, he was recognized as the
defendant's broker and, therefore, a contract of employment be-
tween the defendant and himself was to be implied. The court,
however, did not accept any of the broker's contentions. It first
pointed out that the mere fact that the broker had acted for the
defendant on some prior occasion constituted no ground upon
which to infer that he represented the defendant in the present
transaction. Secondly, the court held that the broker had in no way
acted on behalf of the defendant. The broker merely sought the aid
of the defendant in order to carry out his contract with the sub-
lessor. The court concluded by stating that the option given by the
defendant was not a benefit to him, but was given for the ac-
commodation of the broker's client.
39 349 Ill. App. 111, 109, N.E.2d 923 (lst Dist. 1953).
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As the Forney case, referred to previously, 40 indicates, a mere
volunteer, whose services as broker have not been requested, is not
entitled to any compensation. 4' There is, however, an exception to
this rule. If, by some action, the property owner ratifies the
broker's agency,42 or accepts the benefit of the broker's efforts,43 the
courts will imply a contract of employment between the parties.
In Knotts v. Lake Shore & Mich. Southern Ry. Co.,44 a broker went
to the defendant and inquired if he would be willing to sell his
property to a certain corporation. The broker also asked if he
might represent the defendant, since the buyer would not pay a
commission. The defendant did not object to such an arrangement,
but instead, aided the broker in bringing about negotiations. After
the sale had been completed, the defendant refused to pay the
broker, contending that the broker had no contract of employ-
ment. The court, in holding in favor of the broker, said:
. . . While a mere volunteer cannot recover compensation for
services rendered without a contract of employment, or rendered
in spite of the refusal or against the wish and desire of the owner
... yet where it appears that the owner knows that the alleged
volunteer is a broker, that he is endeavoring to effect a sale to a
prospective buyer and expects to receive compensation for his
services if successful, and where it also appears that with such
knowledge on the part of the owner, the broker was encouraged to
aid in the sale, and led by the owner to believe that he would
receive compensation, a contract to pay compensation will be
implied, if the sale is thereafter consummated through the efforts of
such broker .... 45
An implied contract of employment also arose through rati-
fication of a broker's acts in Carlson v. Marshall.4 6 There the plain-
tiff, -a real estate broker, employed one King who had formerly
been employed by Hart, another broker. King, while employed by
the plaintiff, called upon the defendant who had listed property
with Hart, and told the defendant that he was working for the
plaintiff and attempting to secure a purchaser for the property.
40 Forney v. LaSusa, 8 Ill. App. 2d 555, 132 N.E.2d 55 (1st Dist. 1956), cited at n.26.
41 Wilcox v. Andrews, 150 Ill. App. 27 (1st Dist. 1909).
42 Purgett v. Weinrank, 219 Ill. App. 28 (2d Dist. 1920); Vossler v. Earl, 194 Ill. App.
522 (1st Dist. 1915), af'd, 273 Ill. 367, 112 N.E. 687 (1916); Knotts v. Lake Shore & Mich.
Southern Ry. Co., 172 I1. App. 550 (1st Dist. 1912).
43 Stemm v. Gavin, 255 Il1. 480, 99 N.E. 663 (1912); Carlson v. Marshall, 174 111. App.
438 (1st Dist. 1912).
44 172 Ill. App. 550 (1st Dist. 1912).
45 Id. at 555.
46 174 Ill. App. 438 (1st Dist. 1912).
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Later, the plaintiff took Burkland, who ultimately bought the
property, to the defendant and told the defendant that he would
expect a commission if Burkland purchased the property. The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a commission, and said
that since the defendant knew that the plaintiff and King, his em-
ployee, were conducting negotiations with Burkland with the
expectation that the defendant would pay the plaintiff for such
services, by accepting such services he adopted their acts and be-
came liable to pay plaintiff the usual and reasonable commission
for such services.
Stemm v. Gavin47 presents a case in which an implied contract
resulted when the vendor accepted the benefits of a broker's efforts.
There the defendant, an employee of the plaintiff, a real estate
broker, fraudulently acquired the plaintiff's land, and sold it at a
profit. In a suit for an accounting of the profits, the court awarded
the money to the plaintiff, but compelled him to pay the costs
expended by the defendant in procuring the deal. The court
stated: ". . . If the complainants elected to take the benefit of the
transaction, they ought to take it as it was made, and the fact that the
$200 was illegitimate and a charge to cover usury would not excuse
them from paying it....
Although Illinois law does not require that a broker's contract
of employment be in writing, many such contracts are written. In
cases where a writing is involved, the question generally is not
whether or not a contract exists, but what the terms of the contract
actually mean. Where a broker's employment contract is ambigu-
ous, the court will construe its terms in order to ascertain the intent
of the parties. As an aid in the construction process, the parties are
allowed to present extrinsic evidence as to what was intended by
them when the contract was conceived.4 9 Naturally, when the con-
tract presents no ambiguity, the courts will refuse to construe its
terms. o
47 255 Ill. 480, 99 N.E. 663 (1912).
48 Id. at 487, 99 N.E. at 666.
49 Buttles v. Adkins, 318 Ill. App. 24, 47 N.E.2d 516 (4th Dist. 1943); Gould v. Lewis,
267 Ill. App. 569 (1st Dist. 1932).
50 In Matteson v. Walker, 249 Ill. App. 404 (1st Dist. 1928), a broker's contract of
employment provided that if for any reason the final sale fell through, no commission
would be paid. The broker procured a buyer ready, able and willing to purchase, but his
principal refused to sell. The court refused to grant a recovery to the broker on the
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Typical of cases which require construction is Gould v.
Lewis,51 where the principal agreed to pay the broker a specific sum
from the "proceeds of the sale." The broker contended that "pro-
ceeds" meant anything received from the sale. It was the principal's
theory, however, that "proceeds" meant any profit, and, since he
had not made a profit on the sale, he owed the broker nothing. The
appellate court ruled that because the word "proceeds" was sus-
ceptible to many meanings, its meaning in this case must be deter-
mined in the light of the circumstances surrounding the making
of the contract. The case was, therefore, sent back to the lower
court for a determination with the aid of such extrinsic evidence.
In Topinka v. Wicena,52 the contract of employment recited
that the principal agreed to accept a price of $14,000 "without
commission." The broker, having procured a buyer who paid
$14,700, contended that the principal had agreed to pay him all
consideration for the property in excess of $14,000. It was the
broker's contention that $14,000 "without commission" meant
that the principal agreed to net only that amount and pay the
excess as a commission. The court, however, refused to accept the
broker's theory. The court began by pointing out that an agent can
never be antagonistic toward his principal and is, therefore,
obliged to account to his principal for anything in excess of the
principal's contemplated selling price. Moreover, the agent is duty
bound to attempt to obtain the highest possible price for his prin-
cipal's property. However, the court did not stop by holding that
the broker was not entitled to the extra $700, it went on to con-
strue "without commission" to mean that the principal would not
pay any commission and that the broker was obliged to look to
the buyer for compensation.
53
ground that the contract clearly stated that "if for any reason" the deal fell through no
commission would be paid. The terms of the contract being clear, the court refused to
construe any part of it.
51 267 Ill. App. 569 (lst Dist. 1932).
52 236 Ill. App. 607 (lst Dist. 1925).
3 For cases in line with the principles set forth in Topinka v. Wincea, supra note 52,
Kerfoot v. Hyman, 52 Ill. 512 (1869), where it was held that when a broker is given
property to sell at a certain price and sells it for more, he must account to his principal
for the excess; Kellogg v. Keeler, 27 Ill. App. 244 (Ist Dist. 1888), which held that
authorization for a broker to sell property at a stipulated price does not amount to an
agreement on the part of the principal that the broker may keep anything above that
sum; Edwards v. Hamilton, 168 Il. App. 662 (3d Dist. 1921), where the court held that
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Of course, the question as to whether a contract of employ-
ment exists also arises in cases where there is a writing involved.
First Nat'l Bank in Champaign v. Pace,54 is such a case. There a
bank, as executor, sent to certain real estate brokers a letter stating
that it was soliciting offers to purchase property which was part of
an estate. Each letter admonished the broker that this was "not an
exclusive listing with you." Penniger, a broker who had received
such a letter, presented one Roth who made an offer to buy the
property. Subsequently, Pace, another broker who had received
one of the letters sent by the bank, appeared with Roth who, for no
apparent reason, retracted his earlier offer and placed a higher bid
for the property. Roth finally bought the property at a higher
price, and both Penniger and Pace claimed the commission as the
procuring cause of the sale. While there was no question that
Penniger had procured a buyer ready, willing and able to purchase,
the issue was whether he had a contract of employment with the
bank. In the lower court it was held that the bank had no contract
with Penniger or any other broker, but that it merely solicited
them to submit offers. And, although the ultimate purchaser was
procured by Penniger, the bank's acceptance of the purchaser's
second offer, which was obtained by Pace, obligated the bank to
pay the commission to Pace. The appellate court, however, re-
versed the trial court, and held that Penniger did have a contract
of employment with the bank. The notice sent by the bank gave no
indication that it was not to be considered a listing; if it was not to
be a listing, the words "not an exclusive listing" would not have
been added. The letters gave to each broker who received one a
non-exclusive listing with authority to find a buyer ready, willing
and able to purchase, for which a commission was to be paid. The
appellate court held that Penniger had procured a buyer ready,
willing and able to purchase, and his right to a commission was
not defeated by the buyer's subsequent act of coming in with
another broker and raising his bid.
regardless of how far the selling price may exceed the principal's asking price, the broker
is only entitled to his stipulated commission, and where no commission is mentioned in
his employment contract, the broker must account for all of the proceeds and take the
prevailing commission.
54 35 Ill. App. 2d 390, 183 N.E.2d 35 (3d Dist. 1962).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S AGENCY
The agency created by a real estate broker's contract of em-
ployment can fall into one of three categories: the open listing, the
exclusive agency or the exclusive right to sell. 5
Where the open listing is used, the broker is employed to
bring about whatever transaction his principal has contemplated,
but there is nothing in the agency relationship which precludes the
principal from bringing about the same transaction himself or from
hiring other brokers to do so. In Hunt v. Judd,5 6 the defendant had
hired the plaintiff to find a buyer for a farm. A short time later,
the plaintiff presented a prospect ready, able and willing to pur-
chase on the defendant's terms. However, the defendant refused to
go through with the sale because he had already agreed to sell to a
party procured by another broker. The plaintiff brought an action,
claiming that he was entitled to his commission for having fulfilled
his contract of employment. The court, holding for the defendant,
stated, "A contract of employment does not give the broker an
exclusive agency or the exclusive right to negotiate a sale unless it
is so specified in the contract of employment .. . -57 Here the con-
tract of employment lacked any reference to an exclusive agency or
an exclusive right to sell. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to
hire as many brokers as he wished and was liable for a commission
only to the first broker who procured a buyer. The plaintiff's
agency was terminated at the time a buyer was presented by
another broker, because such agencies automatically come to an
end when the purpose for which they are created is accomplished.
An exclusive agency is created where the broker's contract of
employment specifically gives him the right to bring about a trans-
action for his principal, exclusive of any other broker. The exclu-
sive agency does not, however, preclude the principal from bring-
ing about such a transaction on his own. In Wozniak v. Siegle,58
the broker's contract of employment stated that he was to be the
"exclusive agent" and provided that a commission would be paid if
the property were sold either through the broker or "any other
55 Kratovil, Real Estate Law §§ 162-166 (4th ed. 1964).
56 225 Il1. App. 395 (3d Dist. 1922).
57 Id. at 397.
58 226 Ill. App. 619 (lst Dist. 1922).
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person." After the property was sold by the principal, the broker
brought an action for his commission on the ground that the words
"any other person" applied to the principal as well as to other brok-
ers. The court, however, held that the contract created only an
exclusive agency, and, therefore, the principal had a right to bring
about a sale on his own.
The exclusive right to sell, as its name implies, gives to the
broker the right to procure a buyer exclusive of other brokers and
of the principal. 59 In Flynn v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,6" the Illinois
Supreme Court differentiated between the exclusive agency and
the exclusive right to sell. There the court stated that where there
is an exclusive agency, the owner is not precluded from selling
property himself ,but is barred only from appointing other brokers.
But with an exclusive right to sell, the owner is liable for a com-
mission even if he sells the property on his own.6 1
DUAL AGENCY
Although the rule that one servant cannot serve two masters
is as applicable to real estate brokers as to anyone else, 2 there is an
exception. This exception is operative where the broker is em-
ployed by both the buyer and the seller, with the full knowledge
and consent of both, and acts in good faith toward both. In such a
case the broker may collect a fee from each. 3 This exception is
aptly illustrated by the case of Field v. Ingersoll. 4 There a broker
was employed by the defendant to negotiate a trade for the de-
59 The multiple listing, which is used frequently by today's real estate brokers,
seems to be an offshoot of the exclusive right to sell. It is a method whereby a broker
with an exclusive right to sell furnishes a copy to each member of a pool of brokers. If the
property is sold by a member other than the original broker, the commission is split
between the original broker and the selling broker. Of course there is no agency between
the members of the pool and the principal and, therefore, only the original broker may
sue the principal for a commission.
60 9 Ill. 2d 129, 37 N.E.2d 71 (1956).
61 The court was not compelled to decide which type of agency existed, since the
party claiming a commission was not qualified to be a broker.
62 Bunn v. Keach, 214 Il1. 259 (1905), where a broker was precluded from recovering
his commission from the seller because he was in the employ of the buyer without the
knowledge and consent of the seller and showed a lack of good faith toward the seller
during negotiations for the sale.
63 Field v. Ingersoll, 228 Ill. App. 457 (2d Dist. 1923); Goldstein v. Setka, 195 Ill. App.
584 (1st Dist. 1915); Madden v. Davis, 192 Ill. App. 575 (Ist Dist. 1915); Johnson v.
Kurzenknade, 182 Ill. App. 459 (1st Dist. 1913); Larson v. Shamberg, 148 I11. App. 80
(1st Dist. 1909).
04 228 Ill. App. 457 (2d Dist. 1923).
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fendant's land. Subsequently, the other party to the trade sought to
employ the! broker to represent him in closing the deal. The broker
declined this offer of employment until he had obtained the con-
sent of the defendant. Then, acting with full knowledge and con-
sent of both parties, the broker, on behalf of both parties, con-
summated the transaction. It was held that under such circum-
stances, the broker was entitled to recover compensation from the
defendant as well as the other party to the trade.
R. PECK
